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首页> 外文期刊>International journal of production economics >Who should invest in cost reduction in supply chains?
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Who should invest in cost reduction in supply chains?

机译:谁应该投资于降低供应链成本?

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摘要

We have observed four modes of cost reduction in supply chains from practice. In particular, considering a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer, we identify four modes: the manufacturer solely invests, the retailer solely invests, or both firms collaboratively or independently invest to reduce the manufacturer's production cost. A question that arises naturally is which one is preferred by the manufacturer, the retailer, and the chain. With iso-elastic demand being sensitive to retail price and sales effort, we define channel powers (in addition to cost factors) for both firms to characterize the firms' investments and identify the best mode. We show that both firms are better off by investing collaboratively rather than independently if and only if the two firms have comparable channel powers and comparable cost factors. Moreover, a firm prefers to invest by itself solely rather than invest by its partner or both firms collaboratively if and only if its cost factor is sufficiently smaller than its partner's. We apply our results to supplier development and get some new insights. As a byproduct, the retailer may get less from the chain profit, which contradicts the retailer-dominant property in the literature under consignment contracts with revenue sharing. Finally, we show that our results are robust to different contract forms and whether the two firms have symmetric or asymmetric impacts on cost reduction.
机译:从实践中我们观察到了降低供应链成本的四种模式。特别是,考虑到具有一个制造商和一个零售商的供应链,我们确定了四种模式:制造商单独投资,零售商单独投资,或者两家公司合作或独立投资以降低制造商的生产成本。自然而然产生的一个问题是,制造商,零售商和连锁店更喜欢哪一个。由于等弹性需求对零售价格和销售努力敏感,因此我们为两家公司定义了渠道权力(除了成本因素),以表征公司的投资并确定最佳模式。我们证明,只有当两家公司具有可比的渠道能力和可比的成本因素时,通过合作而不是独立投资,这两家公司的状况才会更好。此外,当且仅当其成本因素比其合伙人的成本因素小得多时,一家公司才更喜欢独自投资而不是由其合伙人或两家公司共同投资。我们将结果应用于供应商开发并获得一些新见解。作为副产品,零售商可能从链条利润中获得较少的利益,这与按收益分成的托运合同下的文献中以零售商为主的财产相矛盾。最后,我们证明了我们的结果对于不同的合同形式以及两个公司是否对降低成本具有对称或非对称影响都具有鲁棒性。

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