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Modelling utility-aggregator-customer interactions in interruptible load programmes using non-cooperative game theory

机译:使用非合作博弈论建模实用程序 - 聚合器 - 在可中断负载计划中的相互作用

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摘要

Aggregator-activated demand response (DR) is widely recognised as a viable means for increasing the flexibility of renewable and sustainable energy systems (RSESs) necessary to accommodate a high penetration of variable renewables. To this end, by acting as DR aggregators and offering energy trading capabilities to smaller cus-tomers, energy retailers unlock additional sources of demand-side flexibility to ensure the cost-optimal operation of RSESs. Accordingly, a growing body of literature has highlighted the ways in which non-cooperative game theory could be used to reduce the gaps between modelled and real-world results for aggregator-mediated DR schemes. This paper aims to contribute to the trends of giving a realistic grounding to research on distributed DR-integrated energy scheduling by using insights from non-cooperative game theory to determine: (1) the optimal trade-off between importing electricity and utilising DR capacity in grid-tied RSESs, (2) the impact of the price elasticity of DR supply of different customer classes - especially, new sources of electricity demand, such as e-mobility - on the system-level dispatch of DR resources, and (3) the financial implications of harnessing the flexibility potential of a large number of end-consumers across different sectors. Accordingly, the principal goal of the paper is to develop an operational planning optimisation model that can be directly applied to real-world aggregator-mediated, market-based demand-side flexibility provisioning domains. To this end, this paper pre-sents the first DR elasticity-aware, non-cooperative game-theoretic DR scheduling model that: (1) yields the best compromise solution between imported power and dispatched DR resources from the utility's perspective, (2) characterises the utility-aggregator-customer interactions during the market-based DR trade process with several customer categories involved, and (3) disaggregates the total sectoral load on the system to individual end-consumers, which has potential implications for pre-feasibility and business case assessments. The application of the model to a conceptual micro-grid for the town of Ohakune, in New Zealand, demonstrates its effectiveness in reducing the daily system operational cost (over the critical peak hours) by-66% and-47% on a repre-sentative summer and winter day, respectively. Importantly, the paper provides statistically significant evidence supporting that activating the flexibility potential of small-to medium-scale end-consumers through specifically defined third-party aggregators in a market-based approach - that is aware of strategic interactions among instrumentally rational economic agents involved in the dispatch and delivery of DR resources - plays a sig-nificant role in the cost-optimal transition to 100%-renewable electricity generation systems within the smart grid paradigm.
机译:聚集器激活的需求响应(DR)被广泛认可为可行的手段,以提高可再生能源系统(RSESS)所需的可灵活性,以适应可变可再生能源的高渗透。为此,通过作为DR聚合器并为较小的CUS Tomers提供能量交易能力提供能源交易能力,能源零售商解锁了额外的需求侧的灵活性,以确保RSES的成本最佳运行。因此,越来越大的文献突出了非合作博弈论可用于减少聚合器介导的DR方案的建模和实际结果之间的间隙的方式。本文旨在促进通过使用非合作博弈理论的洞察来确定分布式DR综合能源调度的现实接地的趋势,以确定:(1)进口电力和利用博士能力之间的最佳权衡网格绑定标准,(2)不同客户课程博士价格弹性的影响 - 尤其是新的电力需求来源,如电子流动性 - 关于博士资源的系统级派遣,(3)利用大量终端消费者对不同部门的灵活性潜力的财务影响。因此,本文的主要目标是开发一个可操作的计划优化模型,可以直接应用于真实的聚集器介导的市场,基于市场的需求侧灵活性供应域。为此,本文提出了第一个DR弹性感知,非协作游戏理论DR调度模型,即:(1)从公用事业的角度来看,从进口电量和派遣博士资源之间产生了最佳的折衷解决方案(2)特征在于,在基于市场的DR贸易过程中,具有若干客户类别的实用 - 聚合器 - 客户交互,(3)将系统的总部门负荷分解给各个终端消费者,这对预处理和业务有潜在的影响案例评估。该模型在新西兰举办俄亥俄州镇概念微电网,证明其在减少日常系统运营成本(在关键高峰时段)的有效性 - 66%和-47%夏季和冬日分别。重要的是,本文提供了统计上的重要证据,支持激活小于中等规模消费者的灵活性潜力,通过专门定义基于市场的方法 - 意识到涉及的有理性的合理经济特工之间的战略相互作用在调度和交付DR资源中 - 在智能电网范例中的成本最佳转换至100%-TemoWable发电系统中发挥SIG-TIGHT的作用。

著录项

  • 来源
    《International journal of electrical power and energy systems》 |2021年第12期|107183.1-107183.23|共23页
  • 作者单位

    Victoria Univ Wellington Sch Engn & Comp Sci Fac Engn Sustainable Energy Syst POB 600 Wellington 6140 New Zealand;

    Victoria Univ Wellington Sch Engn & Comp Sci Fac Engn Sustainable Energy Syst POB 600 Wellington 6140 New Zealand|Stellenbosch Univ Dept Ind Engn ZA-7600 Stellenbosch South Africa|Stellenbosch Univ Ctr Renewable & Sustainable Energy Studies ZA-7600 Stellenbosch South Africa;

    Univ Technol Sydney Inst Sustainable Futures Sydney NSW 2007 Australia;

    Victoria Univ Wellington Sch Engn & Comp Sci Fac Engn Sustainable Energy Syst POB 600 Wellington 6140 New Zealand;

    Victoria Univ Wellington Sch Engn & Comp Sci Fac Engn Sustainable Energy Syst POB 600 Wellington 6140 New Zealand;

  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Micro-grid; Demand response; Energy management; Non-cooperative game theory; Stackelberg leadership;

    机译:微网格;需求响应;能源管理;非合作博弈论;Stackelberg领导;

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