Determinants of stock options awards: evidence from French firms

摘要

The literature on managers' compensation points out several factors specific to firms and to the determinants of stock options awards. At the empirical level, most studies focused on market-oriented governance mechanisms [studies on the US context (Yermack, 1995; T/.ioumis, 2008)] or network-oriented systems [studies on the Japanese context (Uchida, 2006)). We attempt to determine the factors behind stock options awards in a country characterised by a mixed governance system (market- and network-oriented) which is France. We conducted our study on a sample of 152 firms listed on the French stock market (the SBF250 index) during the 2002-2009 period. The results supported the hypothesis that the factors behind managers' stock option compensation are firm size, growth opportunities, manager's age, dividend distribution and ownership concentration.