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Cournot Equilibrium Uniqueness: At 0 Discontinuous Industry Revenue and Decreasing Price Flexibility

机译:Cournot均衡唯一性:在0个不连续行业收入和降低价格灵活性

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摘要

We consider the equilibrium uniqueness problem for a large class of Cournot oligopolies with convex cost functions and a proper price function p with decreasing price flexibility. This class allows for (at 0) discontinuous industry revenue and in particular for p(y) = y~(-α) The paper illustrates in an exemplary way the Selten-Szidarovszky technique based on virtual backward reply functions. An algorithm for the calculation of the unique equilibrium is provided.
机译:我们考虑一大类Cournot寡头垄断的均衡唯一问题,具有凸起的成本函数和适当的价格函数P,价格灵活性降低。该类允许(在0)不连续行业收入,特别是对于P(Y)= Y〜(-α)纸张以示例性方式示出了基于虚拟后向回复功能的Selten-SzidarovsZky技术。提供了一种计算独特均衡的算法。

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