Secure Transmission Against Pilot Spoofing Attack: A Two-Way Training-Based Scheme

摘要

The pilot spoofing attack is one kind of active eavesdropping activities conducted by a malicious user during the channel training phase. By transmitting the identical pilot (training) signals as those of the legal users, such an attack is able to manipulate the channel estimation outcome, which may result in a larger channel rate for the adversary but a smaller channel rate for the legitimate receiver. With the intention of detecting the pilot spoofing attack and minimizing its damages, we design a two-way training-based scheme. The effective detector exploits the intrusive component created by the adversary, followed by a secure beamforming-assisted data transmission. In addition to the solid detection performance, this scheme is also capable of obtaining the estimations of both legitimate and illegitimate channels, which allows the users to achieve secure communication in the presence of pilot spoofing attack. The detection probability is evaluated based on the derived test threshold at a given requirement on the probability of false alarming. The achievable secrecy rate is utilized to measure the security level of the data transmission. Our analysis shows that even without any pre-assumed knowledge of eavesdropper, the proposed scheme is still able to achieve the maximal secrecy rate in certain cases. Numerical results are provided to show that our scheme could achieve a high detection probability as well as secure transmission.