BiMorphing: A Bi-Directional Bursting Defense against Website Fingerprinting Attacks

摘要

Network traffic analysis has been increasingly used in various applications to either protect or threaten people, information, and systems. Website fingerprinting is a passive traffic analysis attack which threatens web navigation privacy. It is a set of techniques used to discover patterns from a sequence of network packets generated while a user accesses different websites. Internet users (such as online activists or journalists) may wish to hide their identity and online activity to protect their privacy. Typically, an anonymity network is utilized for this purpose. These anonymity networks such as Tor (The Onion Router) provide layers of data encryption which poses a challenge to the traffic analysis techniques. Although various defenses have been proposed to counteract this passive attack, they have been penetrated by new attacks that proved the ineffectiveness and/or impracticality of such defenses. In this work, we introduce a novel defense algorithm to counteract the website fingerprinting attacks. The proposed defense obfuscates original website traffic patterns through the use of double sampling and mathematical optimization techniques to deform packet sequences and destroy traffic flow dependency characteristics used by attackers to identify websites. We evaluate our defense against state-of-the-art studies and show its effectiveness with minimal overhead and zero-delay transmission to the real traffic.