Privacy-Preserving Location-Based Services Query Scheme Against Quantum Attacks

摘要

Location-based service (LBS) provides more and more conveniences to people. However, it also brings potential threats of offending users' privacy. How to protect users' privacy in LBS schemes has aroused increasing research interests in recent years. Most of the existing privacy-preserving LBS schemes are based on the hardness of traditional number-theoretic problems such as the integer factorization or the discrete logarithm problems. However, with the development of large scale quantum computers, these traditional problems can be easily solved by Shor's algorithms, hence the security of these LBS schemes is greatly threatened. In this paper, we solve this problem by constructing a privacy-preserving LBS scheme against quantum attacks from an LWE-based key-homomorphic pseudorandom functions (PRF). In our scheme, due to the key-homomorphic property of the PRF, an LBS user only has to compute one PRF value of the target location and the remaining computation is outsourced to a cloud server, which releases the user from heavy computation burden. In addition, by dividing the key encrypting LBS data into two parts and assigning the two parts to the cloud sever and each user respectively, our scheme avoids the threats of key abuse and information leaking of LBS data. Moreover, we use this PRF to realize an authenticated protocol, which protects the communications between the LBS users and the cloud server. We stress that the security of our scheme is based only on the security of the LWE-based key-homomorphic PRF, hence our scheme is the first LBS scheme secure against quantum attacks.