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Message Integrity Protection Over Wireless Channel: Countering Signal Cancellation via Channel Randomization

机译:通过无线通道的消息完整性保护:通过通道随机化进行计数信号取消

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Physical layer message integrity protection and authentication by countering signal-cancellation has been shown as a promising alternative to traditional pure cryptographic message authentication protocols, due to the non-necessity of neither pre-shared secrets nor secure channels. However, the security of such an approach remained an open problem due to the lack of systematic security modeling and quantitative analysis. In this paper, we first establish a novel signal cancellation attack framework to study the optimal signal-cancellation attacker & x0027;s behavior and utility using game-theory, which precisely captures the attacker & x0027;s knowledge using its correlated channel estimates in various channel environments as well as the online nature of the attack. Based on theoretical results, we propose a practical channel randomization approach to defend against signal cancellation attack, which exploits state diversity and swift reconfigurability of reconfigurable antenna to increase randomness and meanwhile reduce correlation of channel state information. We show that by proactively mimicking the attacker and placing restrictions on the attacker & x0027;s location, we can bound the attacker & x0027;s knowledge of channel state information, thereby achieve a guaranteed level of message integrity protection in practice. Besides, we conduct extensive experiments and simulations to show the security and performance of the proposed approach. We believe our novel threat modeling and quantitative security analysis methodology can benefit a wide range of physical layer security problems.
机译:由于既未预共享秘密也不是安全信道,已经将物理层消息取消作为传统纯加密消息认证协议的有希望的替代方法。然而,由于缺乏系统的安全建模和定量分析,这种方法的安全性仍然是一个开放问题。在本文中,我们首先建立一种新的信号消除攻击框架,以研究最佳信号消除攻击者和X0027; S使用游戏理论的行为和效用,这精确地捕获了攻击者和X0027;■使用其相关信道估计在各种相关的信道估计频道环境以及攻击的在线性质。基于理论结果,我们提出了一种实用的通道随机化方法来防御信号取消攻击,该攻击攻击可重构天线的状态分集和迅速重新配置,以增加随机性,同时减少信道状态信息的相关性。我们展示通过积极模仿攻击者并对攻击者和X0027进行限制,我们可以绑定攻击者和X0027;■频道状态信息的知识,从而在实践中实现了一定程度的消息完整性保护。此外,我们开展了广泛的实验和模拟,以展示所提出的方法的安全性和性能。我们认为我们的新型威胁建模和定量安全性分析方法可以使各种物理层安全问题受益。

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