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SMA: A System-Level Mutual Authentication for Protecting Electronic Hardware and Firmware

机译:SMA:用于保护电子硬件和固件的系统级相互认证

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摘要

Due to the enhanced capability of adversaries, electronic systems are now increasingly vulnerable to counterfeiting and piracy. The majority of counterfeit systems today are of cloned type, which have been on the rise in the recent years. Ensuring the security of such systems is of great concern as an adversary can create a backdoor or insert a malware to bypass security modules. The reliability of such systems could also be questionable as the components used in these systems may be counterfeit and/or of inferior quality. It is of prime importance to develop solutions that can prevent an adversary from creating these non-authentic systems. In this paper, we present a novel system-level mutual authentication approach for both the hardware and firmware. The hardware authenticates the firmware by verifying the checksum during the power-up. On the other hand, firmware verifies the identity of the hardware and cannot produce correct results unless it receives a unique hardware fingerprint, which we call as system ID. We propose two secure protocols, TIDP and TIDS, to construct the system ID and authenticate the system by using this unique ID. We show that our approach is resistant to various known attacks.
机译:由于对手能力的增强,电子系统现在越来越容易受到伪造和盗版的攻击。如今,大多数伪造系统都是克隆类型的,近年来这种伪造系统一直在增长。由于攻击者可以创建后门或插入恶意软件以绕过安全模块,因此确保此类系统的安全性非常重要。由于这些系统中使用的组件可能是伪造的和/或质量较差的,因此此类系统的可靠性也可能令人怀疑。开发能够防止对手创建这些非真实系统的解决方案至关重要。在本文中,我们针对硬件和固件提出了一种新颖的系统级双向身份验证方法。硬件通过在加电期间验证校验和来验证固件。另一方面,固件会验证硬件的身份,除非收到唯一的硬件指纹(我们称为系统ID),否则它不会产生正确的结果。我们提出了两个安全协议TIDP和TIDS,以构造系统ID并使用此唯一ID对系统进行身份验证。我们证明了我们的方法可以抵抗各种已知的攻击。

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