EM-Fuzz: Augmented Firmware Fuzzing via Memory Checking

摘要

Embedded systems are increasingly interconnected in the emerging application scenarios. Many of these applications are safety critical, making it a high priority to ensure that the systems are free from malicious attacks. This work aims to detect vulnerabilities, that could be exploited by adversaries to compromise functional correctness, in the embedded firmware, which is challenging especially due to the absence of source code. In particular, we propose EM-Fuzz, a firmware vulnerability detection technique that tightly integrates fuzzing with real-time memory checking. Based on the memory instrumentation, the firmware fuzzing can not only be guided by the traditional branch coverage to generate high-quality seeds to explore hard-to-reach regions but also by the recorded memory sensitive operations to continuously exercise sensitive regions which are prone to being attacked. More importantly, the instrumentation integrates realtime memory checkers to expose memory vulnerabilities, which is not well-supported by existing fuzzers without source code. The experiments on several real-world embedded firmware such as OpenSSL demonstrate that EM-Fuzz significantly improves the performance of state-of-the-art fuzzing tools, such as AFL and AFLFast, with the coverage improvements of 93.98% and 46.89%, respectively. Furthermore, EM-Fuzz exposes a total of 23 vulnerabilities, with an average of about 7-h per vulnerability. AFL and AFLFast together find 10 vulnerabilities, costing about 13 h and 10-h per vulnerability on average, respectively. Out of these 23 vulnerabilities, 16 are previously unknown and have been reported to the upstream product vendors, 7 of which have been assigned with unique CVE identifiers in the U.S. National Vulnerability Database.