首页> 外文期刊>IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking >Cognitive Networks With In-Band Full-Duplex Radios: Jamming Attacks and Countermeasures
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Cognitive Networks With In-Band Full-Duplex Radios: Jamming Attacks and Countermeasures

机译:带内部全双工无线电的认知网络:干扰攻击和对策

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Although in-band full-duplex (IBFD) radios promise to double the throughput of a wireless link, they are more vulnerable to jamming attacks than their out-of-band full-duplex (OBFD) counterparts. For two communicating OBFD nodes, a jammer needs to attack both the uplink and the downlink channels to completely break the communication link. In contrast, only one common channel needs to be jammed in the case of two IBFD nodes. Even worse, a jammer with self-interference suppression (SIS) capabilities (the underlying technique of IBFD radios) can learn the transmitters' activity while injecting interference, allowing it to react instantly to the transmitter's strategies. In this work, we consider a power-constrained IBFD "reactive-sweep" jammer that sweeps through the set of channels by jamming a subset of them simultaneously. We model the interactions between the IBFD radios and the jammer as a stochastic constrained zero-sum Markov game in which nodes adopt the frequency hopping (FH) technique as their strategies to counter jamming attacks. Beside the IBFD transmission-reception (TR) mode, we introduce an additional operation mode, called transmission-detection (TD), in which an IBFD radio transmits and leverages its SIS capability to detect jammers. The aim of the TD mode is to make IBFD radios more cognitive to jamming. The nodes' optimal defense strategy that guides them when to hop and which operational mode (TD or TR) to use is then established from the equilibrium of the stochastic Markov game. We prove that this optimal policy has a threshold structure, in which IBFD nodes stay on the same channel up to a certain number of time slots before hopping. Simulation results show that our policy significantly improves the throughput of IBFD nodes under jamming attacks.
机译:虽然带内的全双工(IBFD)无线电支持无线链路的吞吐量增加吞吐量,但它们比其带外全双工(OBFD)对应物更容易受到干扰攻击。对于两个通信OBFD节点,干扰器需要攻击上行链路和下行链路通道以完全打破通信链路。相比之下,在两个IBFD节点的情况下,只需要一次公共信道。更糟糕的是,具有自干扰抑制(SIS)能力的干扰器(IBFD无线电的底层技术)可以在注入干扰时学习发射器的活动,使其立即对发射器的策略进行反应。在这项工作中,我们考虑通过同时发生它们的子集来扫过一系列通道的功率约束的IBFD“反应性扫描”干扰。我们将IBFD无线电和干扰器之间的交互模型为随机受限的零和马尔可夫游戏,其中节点采用跳频(FH)技术作为其对抗干扰攻击的策略。除了IBFD传输 - 接收(TR)模式旁边,我们引入了一个额外的操作模式,称为传输检测(TD),其中IBFD无线电发送并利用其SIS能力来检测干扰器。 TD模式的目的是使IBFD无线电更加认知与干扰。然后,从随机马尔可夫游戏的平衡建立使用时指导它们的节点的最佳防御策略以及用于使用的操作模式(TD或TR)。我们证明,这种最佳策略具有阈值结构,其中IBFD节点在跳跃之前保持在同一通道上至一定数量的时隙。仿真结果表明,我们的政策显着提高了干扰攻击下IBFD节点的吞吐量。

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