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Multi-Party Privacy Conflict Management in Online Social Networks: A Network Game Perspective

机译:在线社交网络中的多方隐私冲突管理:网络游戏视角

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In this work, we consider the multi-party privacy conflict (MPC) in an online social network (OSN). As many data items uploaded to the OSN are “co-owned” by multiple users with different privacy concerns, some personal information of OSN users may be disclosed by others unintentionally. On the contrary with existing mainstream OSN platforms allowing only the very user uploading the data to set the privacy level, in this article we take a fine-grained approach to resolve MPC, in which all co-owners independently determine whether to share their personal content within the data on OSN. Interacted with its peers, the opinion of a co-owner, however, might be influenced by and consequently influence the decision of its peers. To this end, each co-owner, as an individual decision maker, strikes a tradeoff between its internal privacy preference and the external social influence from its neighbors in a OSN. Specifically, we formulate the interaction among co-owners as a multi-player non-cooperative game with a network structure representing their social relations. For the proposed network game, we establish the existence of multiple (pure-strategy) equilibria, and characterize them accordingly. The convergence of interaction is also investigated when synchronous and asynchronous best-response updates are used, respectively. We note that when the action set for the players is discrete, the game exhibits non-linear dynamics, making it challenging to analyze the convergence behavior. We prove that synchronous update may lead to either an equilibrium or a strategy cycle, and the asynchronous update always leads to an equilibrium. Building upon this analysis, we advocate a practical implementation of the proposed MPC management, which balances the automation of the management and intervention of users. Moreover, we take one step further to develop approaches aiming to reach a “stronger agreement” among the players for the sake of benefits of uploader and OSN provider. Numerical examples are also provided to corroborate the analytical results.
机译:在这项工作中,我们考虑在线社交网络(OSN)中的多方隐私冲突(MPC)。由于许多上传到OSN的数据项由具有不同隐私问题的多个用户是“共同拥有”,因此可以无意地披露OSN用户的一些个人信息。与现有的主流OSN平台相反,只有用户上传数据来设置隐私级别,在本文中,我们采取了一个细粒度的方法来解决MPC,其中所有共同主角独立地确定是否分享他们的个人内容在OSN上的数据中。然而,与同行互动,同居的意见可能受到影响,并因此影响其同行的决定。为此,作为个别决策者,每个共同主人都会袭击其内部隐私偏好与奥恩邻国的外部社会影响力之间的权衡。具体而言,我们制定共同业主作为多人非合作游戏的相互作用,具有代表其社会关系的网络结构。对于所提出的网络游戏,我们建立了多种(纯策略)均衡的存在,并相应地表征。当分别使用同步和异步最佳响应更新时,还研究了交互的收敛。我们注意到,当为玩家设置的动作是离散的时,游戏展现出非线性动态,使得分析收敛行为的挑战。我们证明同步更新可能导致均衡或策略周期,并且异步更新总是导致平衡。建立在此分析后,我们倡导建议的MPC管理的实际实施,这使得用户的自动化和干预的自动化。此外,我们进一步迈出一步,以便为上传者和OSN提供者的福利而努力制定旨在在球员中达到“更强协议”的方法。还提供了数值例子以证实分析结果。

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