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Qualitative One-to-Many Multi-Issue Negotiation: Approximating the QVA

机译:定性一对多多问题协商:近似QVA

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When there is one buyer interested in obtaining a service from one of a set of sellers, multi-attribute or multi-issue auctions can ensure an allocation that is efficient. Even when there is no transferable utility (e.g., money), a recent qualitative version of the Vickrey auction may be used, the QVA, to obtain a Pareto-efficient outcome where the best seller wins. However, auctions generally require that the preferences of at least one party participating in the auction are publicly known, while often making this information public is costly, undesirable, or even impossible. It would therefore be useful to have a method that does not impose such a requirement, but is still able to approximate the outcome of such an auction. The main question addressed here is whether the Pareto-efficient best-seller outcome in multi-issue settings without transferable utility (such as determined by the QVA) can be reasonably approximated by multi-bilateral closed negotiation between a buyer and multiple sellers. In these closed negotiations parties do not reveal their preferences explicitly, but make alternating offers. The main idea is to have multiple rounds of such negotiations. We study three different variants of such a protocol: one that restricts the set of allowed offers for both the buyer and the seller, one where the winning offer is announced after every round, and one where the sellers are only told whether they have won or not after every round. It is shown experimentally that this protocol enables agents that can learn preferences to obtain agreements that approximate the Pareto-efficient best-seller outcome as defined by the auction mechanism. We also show that the strategy that exploits such a learning capability in negotiation is robust against and dominates a Zero Intelligence strategy. It thus follows that the requirement to publicly announce preferences can be removed when negotiating parties are equipped with the proper learning capabilities and negotiate using the proposed multi-round multi-bilateral negotiation protocol.
机译:当有一个买方有兴趣从一组卖方中的一个卖方获得服务时,多属性或多项目拍卖可以确保有效的分配。即使没有可转让的效用(例如金钱),也可以使用Vickrey拍卖的最新定性版本QVA来获得帕累托效率高的结果,从而使最佳卖方获胜。但是,拍卖通常要求至少公开参与拍卖的一方的偏好,而通常使该信息公开是昂贵的,不希望的,甚至是不可能的。因此,具有一种不施加这样的要求但是仍然能够近似这种拍卖的结果的方法将是有用的。这里要解决的主要问题是,在没有可转让效用(例如由QVA确定)的多重发行情况下,帕累托有效的畅销书结果是否可以通过买卖双方之间的多边双边封闭式谈判合理地估算。在这些封闭的谈判中,当事方没有明确透露自己的偏好,而是交替提出要约。主要思想是进行多轮此类谈判。我们研究了此协议的三种不同变体:一种对买卖双方都限制了一组允许的报价;一种在每轮结束后宣布中标的报价;另一种则仅告诉卖方是否中标了。不是每回合之后。实验表明,此协议使能够学习偏好的代理能够获得近似于拍卖机制所定义的帕累托有效畅销书结果的协议。我们还表明,在谈判中利用这种学习能力的策略可以抵御零智商策略,并占据主导地位。因此,当谈判方具备适当的学习能力并使用提议的多轮多边双边谈判协议进行谈判时,可以取消公开宣布偏好的要求。

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