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Fabrication Attacks: Zero-Overhead Malicious Modifications Enabling Modern Microprocessor Privilege Escalation

机译:加工攻击:零开销的恶意修改使现代微处理器特权升级

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The wide deployment of general purpose and embedded microprocessors has emphasized the need for defenses against cyber-attacks. Due to the globalized supply chain, however, there are several stages where a processor can be maliciously modified. The most promising stage, and the hardest during which to inject the hardware trojan, is the fabrication stage. As modern microprocessor chips are characterized by very dense, billion-transistor designs, such attacks must be very carefully crafted. In this paper, we demonstrate zero overhead malicious modifications on both high-performance and embedded microprocessors. These hardware trojans enable privilege escalation through execution of an instruction stream that excites the necessary conditions to make the modification appear. The minimal footprint, however, comes at the cost of a small window of attack opportunities. Experimental results show that malicious users can gain escalated privileges within a few million clock cycles. In addition, no system crashes were reported during normal operation, rendering the modifications transparent to the end user.
机译:通用和嵌入式微处理器的广泛部署强调了防御网络攻击的必要性。但是,由于全球化的供应链,可以在多个阶段对处理器进行恶意修改。制造阶段是最有前途且最难注入硬件木马的阶段。由于现代微处理器芯片的特点是非常密集的十亿晶体管设计,因此必须非常谨慎地进行这种攻击。在本文中,我们演示了高性能和嵌入式微处理器上零开销的恶意修改。这些硬件木马通过执行指令流来激发特权升级,该指令流激发使修改出现的必要条件。然而,最小的占用空间是以较小的攻击机会为代价的。实验结果表明,恶意用户可以在几百万个时钟周期内获得升级权限。此外,在正常操作期间未报告系统崩溃,从而使修改对最终用户透明。

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