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Incentivising flood risk adaptation through risk based insurance premiums: Trade-offs between affordability and risk reduction

机译:通过基于风险的保险费来增强洪水风险适应能力:承受能力与降低风险之间的权衡

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The financial incentives offered by the risk-based pricing of insurance can stimulate policyholder adaptation to flood risk while potentially conflicting with affordability. We examine the trade-off between risk reduction and affordability in a model of public private flood insurance in France and Germany estimating household flood adaptation decisions in response to financial insurance incentives. An integrated model of household level mitigation behaviour and insurance premiums is developed. The model investigates how aggregated household adaptation behaviour differs under financial incentives as compared to when households act on their own subjective risk beliefs. The results indicate that insurance based incentives are able to promote adaptation. The incentives could reduce residential flood risk by 12% in Germany and 24% in France by 2040. The higher level of flood risk in France results in a strong present incentive to reduce risk. Rapid growth of flood risks in Germany results in more effective incentives in later periods. Insurance is unaffordable for approximately 20% of households at risk. Providing vouchers, to correct for unaffordability, after 2040 has a lower cost than the total incentivised damage reduction. A policy recommendation is that strengthening the link between flood insurance and financial incentives can guide household level adaptation. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:基于风险的保险定价提供的财务激励措施可以刺激投保人适应洪灾风险,同时可能与承受能力产生冲突。我们在法国和德国的一种公共私人洪水保险模型中研究了降低风险和承受能力之间的权衡,该模型估计了家庭洪水适应决策以响应金融保险激励措施。建立了家庭层面缓解行为和保险费的综合模型。该模型调查了与家庭根据自己的主观风险信念采取行动相比,在经济激励下总的家庭适应行为有何不同。结果表明,基于保险的激励措施能够促进适应。到2040年,这些诱因可能使德国的住宅洪水风险降低12%,法国的法国降低24%。法国更高的洪水风险水平导致了目前强烈的降低风险的诱因。德国洪水风险的快速增长导致在后期产生更有效的激励措施。大约有20%有风险的家庭无法负担得起保险。在2040年后提供优惠券以纠正无法承受的费用,其成本要比减少激励性总费用低。一项政策建议是,加强洪水保险与经济激励措施之间的联系可以指导家庭层面的适应。 (C)2016 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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