In his work, Robert Brandom presents an expressivist theory about logic. According to him, logic plays the expressive role of making explicit inferential relations implicit in our linguistic practices. Inferential relations constitute the content of our concepts. In our paper, we explore the thesis that Brandom’s logical expressivism is an anti-realist theory about logic. Logical realists defend the independent existence of logical facts in relation to our cognitive and linguistic practices. In this view, logic truly describes the structure of reality, as it represents logical facts. By contrast, logical anti-realists do not commit to the independent existence of logical facts to understand the nature of logic. In contrast to a realist view, we show that Brandom’s anti-realism renders a simple and economic ontology and also the foundation of a pragmatist alternative to examine the normativity of logic, the phenomenon of rival logics and the nature of our rationality.
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