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Questioning Searle’s Explanation of Unconscious Mental State

机译:质疑Searle对无意识精神状态的解释

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Upholding the principle of Biological Naturalism, John Searle requires that explanation of mental phenomenon must be coherent with findings in scientific studies. To meet the requirement of coherence, Searle puts forward his “connection principle”. This paper contends that his requirement is not well met in his own study of unconscious mental states. Firstly, his classification of unconscious mental states is not reasonable. For example, he has classified “knowledge of language” into deep unconscious mental state, which in nature belongs to nonconscious mental state. The classification is not in accord with findings in linguistic studies, nor with linguistic practice. Secondly, his explanation for the unconscious mental process is doubtful. Based on his “connection principle”, unconscious mental state is nothing but potential conscious mental state and therefore the processing of unconscious mental activity should resemble that of conscious mental activity. But this explanation is not coherent with findings in cognitive science. The paper concludes that Searle fails in his requirement of coherence.
机译:秉承生物自然主义的原则,约翰·塞尔要求解释心理现象必须与科学研究的调查结果相干。为了满足一致性的要求,Searle提出了他的“连接原则”。本文认为,他的要求在他对无意识的心理状态的研究中并不充足。首先,他对无意识精神状态的分类是不合理的。例如,他已经将“语言知识”分类为深入无意识的心理状态,其本质上属于非意识的心理状态。分类不符合语言研究的调查结果,也不是语言实践。其次,他对无意识的心理过程的解释是值得怀疑的。根据他的“联系原则”,无意识的精神状态只不过是潜在的意识精神状态,因此加工无意识的心理活动应该类似于有意识的心理活动。但是,这种解释并不与认知科学的调查结果相干。本文得出结论,Searle在他的一致性要求中失败。

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