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Optimal Operation and Financing Decisions in Green Supply Chain with a Capital-Constrained Manufacturer

机译:具有资本限制制造商的绿色供应链中的最佳运行和融资决策

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摘要

Capital constraint, immensely existing in practice, became major stressors for manufacturers during the green research and development (R & D) triggered by managers integrating green concept into their business models. Considering the initial capital of a capital-constrained manufacturer, this paper formulates a Stackelberg game model comprising a manufacturer and a retailer, to discuss the optimal operation and financing decisions under the bank financing channel and trade credit financing channel, to detect the relationship between the manufacturer’s initial capital and green R & D investment, and to find which financing channel is better by comparing the two financing channels when the same initial capital is set. According to the above analysis, the results find that the capital-constrained manufacturer prefers financing only when meeting certain conditions. Furthermore, financing might be detrimental to the manufacturer but always beneficial to the retailer. Especially, under trade credit financing channel, the profit improvement of the retailer is higher than the manufacturer in the same financing channel, which suggests that the retailer has strong internal motivation to cooperate with the manufacturer from the perspective of financing.
机译:资本限制,在实践中非常现有的,成为制造商的主要压力因素在绿色研发期间(研发)被整合到他们的商业模式的经理触发。考虑到资本限制制造商的初始资本,本文制定了一个包含制造商和零售商的Stackelberg游戏模型,讨论银行融资渠道和贸易信贷融资渠道下的最佳运作和融资决策,以检测该渠道之间的关系制造商的初始资本和绿色研发投资,并找到哪些融资渠道更好,通过比较同一初始资本的融资渠道。根据上述分析,结果发现资本限制制造商仅在满足某些条件时更喜欢融资。此外,融资可能对制造商有害,但总是对零售商有益。特别是,在贸易信贷筹资渠道下,零售商的利润改善高于同一融资渠道的制造商,这表明零售商与制造商以融资的角度合作的强大内部动机。

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