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An Empirical Study on Optimal Strategies of Industry-University-Institute Green Innovation with Subsidy

机译:津贴工业大学学院绿色创新的最优策略实证研究

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With the increasing awareness of environmental protection and the complexity and rapid change of technological innovation, more and more enterprises seek to develop and research (R&D) institutions to cooperate with green innovation. In order to promote the cooperation efficiency of green innovation, this paper develops a multi-stage game model to analyze the optimal strategies of the enterprise, the university and the policy-maker with consumer learning and government subsidy. Then the paper compares the difference of optimal subsidy between the single-stage green innovation cooperation and the multi-stage green innovation cooperation. The research shows that consumers’ initial learning factors and green innovation cooperation cycle have a significant impact on the optimal input level of the enterprise and the university and also have a significant impact on the optimal subsidy of the government. The specific government subsidy and subsidy ratio depend on the comprehensive role of consumer learning factors and the green innovation cooperation cycle. In the end, we propose that the government should subsidize the university at times when the initial consumer learning factor is low; the government subsidy should be properly lagged when the initial consumer learning factor is high.
机译:随着环境保护的认识和技术创新的复杂性和快速变化,越来越多的企业寻求开发和研究(研发)机构与绿色创新合作。为了促进绿色创新的合作效率,开发了一个多级游戏模型,分析了企业,大学和消费者学习和政府补贴的企业最佳策略。然后本文比较了单级绿色创新合作与多级绿色创新合作之间的最佳补贴差异。该研究表明,消费者的初始学习因素和绿色创新合作周期对企业和大学的最佳投入水平产生了重大影响,并对政府最佳补贴产生了重大影响。具体的政府补贴和补贴率取决于消费者学习因素和绿色创新合作循环的全面作用。最终,我们建议政府应在最初的消费者学习因素低时补贴大学;当最初的消费者学习因素高时,政府补贴应得到适当的滞后。

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