In recent work, Andrew T. Forcehimes and Robert B. Talisse correctly note that G.A. Cohen’s fact-insensitivity thesis, properly understood, is explanatory. This observation raises an important concern. If fact-insensitive principles are explanatory, then what role can they play in normative deliberations? The purpose of my paper is, in part, to address this question. Following David Miller, I indicate that on a charitable understanding of Cohen’s thesis, an explanatory principle explains a justificatory fact by completing an otherwise logically incomplete inference. As a result, the explanatory role such a principle plays is inseparable from its status as a (not necessarily successful) justificatory reason. With this interpretation in hand, I then proceed to argue that Lea Ypi’s and Robert Jubb’s recent criticisms fail to undermine Cohen’s thesis, and that fact-insensitive principles, once discovered, are especially helpful for purposes of deliberation in circumstances characterized by changing and changeable feasibility constraints.
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机译：在最近的工作中，Andrew T. Forcehimes和Robert B. Talisse正确地指出了G.A.正确理解的科恩事实不敏感论点是可以解释的。这种观察引起了重要的关注。如果对事实不敏感的原则具有解释性，那么它们在规范性审议中可以发挥什么作用？我的论文的目的部分是为了解决这个问题。在戴维·米勒（David Miller）之后，我指出，根据对科恩（Cohen）论文的慈善理解，一种解释性原理通过完成否则会在逻辑上不完整的推论来解释一个正当事实。结果，这种原则所起的解释性作用与其作为（不一定是成功的）理由的地位密不可分。在掌握了这种解释之后，我将继续争辩说，Lea Ypi和Robert Jubb的近期批评未能破坏科恩的论点，事实不敏感的原理一经发现，对于在变化多端，可行性多变的情况下进行审议特别有用。约束。
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