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Deterring and Dissuading Nuclear Terrorism

机译:遏制和劝阻核恐怖主义

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???While nuclear deterrence theory may be well-suited to dealing with nuclear-armed states, its suitability for deterring nuclear terrorism has frequently been questioned since 9/11. While terrorist organizations do not necessarily act uniformly or according to the same underlying beliefs, many of the most aggressive organizations are motivated by an ideology that embraces martyrdom and an apocalyptic vision.1 This ideology may be based on religion or a desire to overthrow a government. Consequently, terrorists motivated by ideology who intend to use a stolen or improvised nuclear device against the United States or its interests may not care about the resulting military repercussions following a nuclear attack. In such a scenario, some strategists think a terrorist organization's leadership may prove "undeterrable" by traditional military means. Nevertheless, deterrence is still a critical element in U.S. national strategy to prevent a nuclear attack. Furthermore, deterrence combined with dissuasion works to reduce the likelihood of nuclear terrorism being used against the United States, while also mitigating the consequences should such an act actually occur.
机译:尽管核威慑理论可能非常适合与核武国家打交道,但自9/11以来,它在威慑核恐怖主义方面的适用性就经常受到质疑。尽管恐怖组织不一定采取统一行动或遵循相同的基本信念,但许多最具侵略性的组织的动机却是and教和世界末日的理想主义。1这种意识形态可能基于宗教或推翻政府的愿望。 。因此,出于意识形态动机而打算对美国或其利益使用被盗或即兴使用的核装置的恐怖分子可能不会在意核袭击后造成的军事影响。在这种情况下,一些战略家认为恐怖组织的领导可能通过传统的军事手段证明“不容置疑”。尽管如此,威慑仍然是美国防止核攻击国家战略中的关键要素。此外,威慑与劝说相结合,可减少针对美国使用核恐怖主义的可能性,同时也减轻了这种行为实际发生时的后果。

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