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Strategic introduction of the marketplace channel considering logistics costs and product information

机译:考虑物流成本和产品信息的战略性市场渠道介绍

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In recent years, it is prevalent that reselling-first online retailers share their online marketplace with suppliers. Such marketplace introduction strategy leads ?ckle consumers to have more options. Both the logistics costs of products and product information of channels primarily affect consumers’ behavior and retailers’ profits. From the perspective of retailers, the strategy is not clear. Motivated by the observation, we develop a retailer-Stackelberg game model to investigate the introduction of the marketplace in the interaction of logistics cost-value (LCV) ratio and product information. Our analytical results indicate that e?ectively deliver of product information has a positive effect on retail prices. Moreover, after the marketplace channel enter, the changes in consumer demand varies by product categories with differing LCV ratio. Note that, we show that the introduction is more beneficial for retailers whose product information is more available. Under this situation, the suppliers who have a low (respectively, high) information delivery efficiency and sell the product with big (respectively, small) LCV ratio is not welcome by retailers. In addition, when the marketplace product information is more available, retailers are more likely to open the platform for the big LCV ratio product. Our findings not only provide the suggestions for reselling-first online retailers who want to introduce and manage marketplace channel but also contribute to the literature of marketplace and online multichannel supply chain.
机译:近年来,以转售为先的在线零售商与供应商共享在线市场是很普遍的。这种市场引入策略导致充实的消费者拥有更多选择。产品的物流成本和渠道的产品信息都主要影响消费者的行为和零售商的利润。从零售商的角度来看,该策略尚不明确。根据观察结果,我们开发了零售商-Stackelberg博弈模型,以研究物流成本-价值比(LCV)与产品信息之间的相互作用引入市场。我们的分析结果表明,有效地提供产品信息对零售价格具有积极影响。此外,进入市场渠道后,消费者需求的变化随产品类别的不同,LCV比率也不同。请注意,我们表明,该介绍对于产品信息更多的零售商更有利。在这种情况下,信息传递效率较低(分别为高)并出售具有较大(分别为小)LCV比率的产品的供应商将不受零售商的欢迎。另外,当市场产品信息更多时,零售商更有可能为大型LCV比率产品打开平台。我们的发现不仅为想要引入和管理市场渠道的转销优先在线零售商提供了建议,而且为市场和在线多渠道供应链的文献做出了贡献。

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