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Strategic introduction of the marketplace channel under spillovers from online to offline sales

机译:从网上溢出的市场渠道的战略介绍从网上到离线销售

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In recent years, the increasing prevalence of online retailing has given rise to a novel e-channel-the marketplace-in which manufacturers sell their products directly to consumers by paying fees to e-tailers. This e-channel, unlike the conventional reseller e-channel, endows manufacturers with absolute control over prices, which helps protect brick-and-mortar channels, especially in the presence of different types of spillovers from online to offline sales. However, the marketplace channel is nevertheless not used in practice in some instances as a result of the e-tailer's costly platform fees and the manufacturer's inefficiency in direct retail sales. These different attitudes raise key questions of whether and under what conditions the marketplace channel should be introduced in addition to the reseller channel. In this paper, we study these problems by measuring the combined effects of the online spillover, the platform fee and the manufacturer's retailing inefficiency. We demonstrate that the manufacturer's willingness to employ the marketplace channel increases and the e-tailer's willingness to do so decreases in the level of spillovers; when combining the two, we find that a Pareto improvement can be achieved under a moderate spillover. We also present an interesting insight that the introduction of the marketplace channel fundamentally changes the effects of the spillover on the e-tailer while merely strengthening those on the manufacturer. Moreover, a higher platform fee does not necessarily incentivize the e-tailer to join the marketplace, and the manufacturer's retailing inefficiency may either benefit or harm the e-tailer, depending on the size of the platform fee.
机译:近年来,在线零售的普遍越来越普及,新的电子渠道 - 通过支付电子茶叶的费用,制造商将其产品销售给消费者的市场。与传统的经销商电子通道不同,赋予厂商绝对控制价格,这有助于保护砂浆渠道,特别是在不同类型的溢出率,从网上到离线销售。然而,由于电子茶叶的昂贵的平台费用和制造商直接零售销售的效率低,因此在某些情况下,市场渠道仍未在某些情况下使用。这些不同的态度提出了除了经销商频道之外应引入市场信道的条件的关键问题。在本文中,我们通过测量在线溢出,平台费和制造商零售效率低下的综合影响来研究这些问题。我们证明制造商愿意雇用市场渠道的愿意增加,而E-Tainer的愿意在溢出水平上减少;结合两者时,我们发现在适度溢出下可以实现帕累托改进。我们还提出了一个有趣的识别,即市场渠道的引入根本地来改变了溢出在电子拖放器上的影响,同时仅加强制造商的速度。此外,更高的平台费用并不一定会激励电子拖车加入市场,制造商的零售价值低效率可能会受益或损害电子拖放,具体取决于平台费的规模。

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