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Judicial Commission Supervision For Judges Behaviour In Independent Judiciary

机译:司法委员会对独立司法中法官行为的监督

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ABSTRACT: The study aims to identify and explain the relevance of the substantive law of the Judicial Commission in conducting supervision to judges with the principles of independent judicial power, including the models used in monitoring the behavior of the Judicial Commission judges, and the impact of monitoring the behavior of judges. The study was conducted in Jakarta, the place of the Judicial Commission, as the targeted institution, because it focuses in supervising the activities of judges of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional. The type of research is empirical legal research through the three-level approaches of philosophy, dogmatic, and theoretical laws. The research sample was determined by purposive sampling technique. Data collection instruments used where interviews and documentation collection then analyzed qualitatively. Results of the study revealed that the substance of the law governing the authority of the Judicial Commission to supervise the activity of judges is broadly in line with the principle of independent judicial power, except the setting of membership composition and procedures of decision making of Honorary Judges. This is potentially affecting the independence of the judicial power. Judicial Commission applies the eclectic model of supervision, by combining the model of supervision; preventive (but not include the recruitment, promotion and transfer), limited repressive, and limited external supervision models (external quasi). The Model of Judicial Commission monitoring for the behavior of judges is not included in the checks and balances surveillance. The Supervision of the Judicial Commission for activity of judges is not implemented significantly in the form of supervisory authority (especially the preventive acts), the application of sanctions toward judges who violate the KEPPH, human resources (quantitatively), and yustisiabelen sound impact. It is recommended to the government and the Parliament to change the Article 22F par. 2 on the composition of 4 Commissioners and 3 justices to 3 Commissioners, 3 justices, and 3 elements of the society. Also, it is recommended to amend the Law No.18 of 2011 to expand the Judicial Commission oversight duties including the recruitment, the promotion, the transfer of judges, and in order to confirm the existence of the Judicial Commission as an external supervisor. The consequence is that the place of the Judicial Commission should be moved to outside the chapter of the judicial authority. In order to improve more on the effectiveness of supervision the activity of judges, it is necessary to have capacity building on the Judicial Commission. It is recommended to the government and parliament to significantly increase the budget of the Judicial Commission. Also, the Judicial Commission should improve more on the coordination, cooperation with the Supreme Court so that recommendation on more sanctions is effective.
机译:摘要:该研究旨在确定并解释司法委员会实体法在以独立司法权原则对法官进行监督方面的相关性,包括用于监测司法委员会法官行为的模型以及司法委员会的影响。监督法官的行为。这项研究是在司法委员会所在地雅加达进行的,因为该研究的重点是监督最高法院和宪法法院法官的活动。研究类型是通过哲学,教条和理论定律的三级方法进行的经验法学研究。研究样本是通过有目的抽样技术确定的。然后对访谈和文献收集进行定性分析的数据收集工具。研究结果表明,管辖司法委员会监督法官活动的权力的法律的实质与独立司法权原则基本一致,但成员组成的设置和名誉法官的决策程序除外。这可能会影响司法权力的独立性。司法委员会采用折衷的监督模式,结合监督模式;预防(但不包括招募,晋升和调动),有限的镇压和有限的外部监督模型(外部准)。制衡监督未包括对法官行为进行监督的司法委员会模式。司法委员会对法官活动的监督在监督权限(尤其是预防行为),对违反KEPPH的法官实施制裁,人力资源(在数量上)以及对尤斯蒂亚贝伦的良好影响等方面并未得到明显实施。建议政府和议会更改第22F条的规定。关于4名专员和3名法官组成的2到3名专员,3名法官和社会的3个组成部分。另外,建议修订2011年第18号法律,扩大司法委员会的监督职责,包括征聘,晋升,法官调动,并确认司法委员会是否有外部监督人员。结果是,司法委员会的位置应移至司法机构权限之外。为了进一步提高法官活动的监督效率,有必要对司法委员会进行能力建设。建议政府和议会大幅增加司法委员会的预算。此外,司法委员会应进一步改善与最高法院的协调与合作,以使对更多制裁的建议有效。

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