Going organic

摘要

Experience on operations in Afghanistan has highlighted the limits of air power's utility in waging counter-insurgency operations, even with modern precision munitions. In recent statements, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has pointed out that collateral damage - that all-encompassing eupl emism - poses significant risks to the successful outcome of the mission in Afghanistan. The lesson we can draw from this is firstly, that more ground forces are required to provide effective and long-lasting security across a distributed rural battlespace, and secondly, that ground forces require increased precision organic firepower. Added to this, insurgents have changed their tactics to focus on using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to attack coalition partners, which in many respects is allowing British forces to take the front foot and initiate most contacts in intelligence-led operations. More than anything, this means British forces require systems that are highly mobile, accurate, and capable of penetrating and destroying defensive positions (which could be mud-brick compounds or caves) without risking civilian casualties. Notable examples of this shift can be seen in the successful Operation Sond Chara (Red Dagger), in which 3 Commando Brigade won significant battles against Taliban strongholds around the town of Nad-e-Ali in Kandahar province.