首页> 外文期刊>Corporate Governance >The effects of ownership structure on likelihood of financial distress: an empirical evidence
【24h】

The effects of ownership structure on likelihood of financial distress: an empirical evidence

机译:所有权结构对财务困境可能性的影响:经验证据

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
获取外文期刊封面目录资料

摘要

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of corporate governance proxies by ownership structure on the likelihood of firms’ financial distress for a sample of 146 Pakistani public-limited companies listed at the Karachi Stock Exchange over the period of 2003-2012. Design/methodology/approach: The dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator and panel logistic regression (PLR) are used to determine the impact of corporate governance on the financial distress. The ownership structure is used as a determinant of corporate governance, while the Altman Z-score is utilized as an indicator of financial distress, as it measures financial distress inversely. The smaller the values of the Z-score, the higher will be the risk of financial distress. Findings: The authors find insignificant impact of ownership structure on firms’ likelihood of financial distress based on the dynamic GMM method. However, the PLR results indicate that foreign shareholdings have a significant negative association with firms’ likelihood of financial distress, in the case of Pakistan. An evidence of a negative and insignificant relationship between institutional ownership and financial distress was observed, which indicates the passive role of institutional investors in Pakistan. The results also reveal a positive and significant relationship between insider’s ownership and likelihood of financial distress. This finding is consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis which predicts that insiders are more aligned with their self-interest than outside shareholders’ interest when their shareholding increases in the business. Furthermore, the results also reveal insignificant association between government shareholdings and the probability of financial distress. The reason could be the social welfare objective of the government entities rather than profit maximization. Practical implications: The findings of this study provide more insight to corporate managers and investors about the association between the quality of corporate governance and the degree of financial distress, with respect to Pakistani firms. Furthermore, this study contributes to the existing literature by adding new evidence from developing countries like Pakistan which are helpful for regulatory bodies and policymakers in the formulation of long-term corporate governance strategies to manage the financial distress. It is well established that strengthening the quality of corporate governance practices enhances the efficiency of capital markets and reduces the probability of financial distress. Originality/value: The study extends the body of existing literature on corporate governance and the likelihood of financial distress with reference to Pakistan. The results suggest that policymakers may pay special attention to the quality of corporate governance, specifically ownership structure, while predicting corporate financial distress.
机译:目的:本文的目的是通过所有权结构探讨公司治理代理在2003-2012年间在卡拉奇证券交易所上市的146家巴基斯坦上市公司样本中公司财务困境可能性上的作用。 。设计/方法/方法:动态广义矩(GMM)估计器和面板逻辑回归(PLR)用于确定公司治理对财务困境的影响。所有权结构被用作公司治理的决定因素,而Altman Z得分则被用作财务困境的指标,因为它以相反的方式衡量财务困境。 Z分数的值越小,财务困境的风险就越高。调查结果:作者发现,基于动态GMM方法,股权结构对企业财务困境的可能性影响不大。但是,PLR结果表明,在巴基斯坦,外国持股与企业的财务困境可能性显着负相关。观察到机构所有权与财务困境之间存在消极和微不足道关系的证据,这表明机构投资者在巴基斯坦的被动作用。结果还显示,内部人的所有权与财务困境的可能性之间存在积极且显着的关系。这一发现与根深蒂固的假设相一致,该假设预测,当内部持股量增加时,内部人更符合自身利益,而不是外部股东的利益。此外,结果还表明,政府持股与财务困境的可能性之间的关联不明显。原因可能是政府实体的社会福利目标,而不是利润最大化。实际意义:这项研究的结果为公司经理和投资者提供了更多有关巴基斯坦公司的公司治理质量与财务困境程度之间关系的见解。此外,本研究通过增加来自巴基斯坦等发展中国家的新证据为现有文献做出了贡献,这些新证据有助于监管机构和政策制定者制定长期公司治理策略来管理财务困境。众所周知,加强公司治理实践的质量可以提高资本市场的效率,并减少财务困境的可能性。原创性/价值:该研究扩展了有关巴基斯坦公司治理和财务困境可能性的现有文献。结果表明,决策者在预测公司财务困境时应特别注意公司治理的质量,特别是所有权结构。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号