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Using Instruction Block Signatures to Counter Code Injection Attacks

机译:使用指令块签名来抵抗代码注入攻击

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With more computing platforms connected to the Internet each day, computer system security has become a critical issue. One of the major security problems is execution of malicious injected code. In this paper we propose new processor extensions that allow execution of trusted instructions only. The proposed extensions verify instruction block signatures in run-time. Signatures are generated during a trusted installation process, using a multiple input signature register (MISR), and stored in an encrypted form. The coefficients of the MISR and the key used for signature encryption are based on a hidden processor key. Signature verification is done in the background, concurrently with program execution, thus reducing negative impact on performance. The preliminary results indicate that the proposed processor extensions will prevent execution of any unauthorized code at a relatively small increase in system complexity and execution time.
机译:随着每天有越来越多的计算平台连接到Internet,计算机系统安全已成为一个关键问题。主要的安全问题之一是恶意注入代码的执行。在本文中,我们提出了新的处理器扩展,它们仅允许执行受信任的指令。建议的扩展会在运行时验证指令块签名。签名是在可信安装过程中使用多个输入签名寄存器(MISR)生成的,并以加密形式存储。 MISR的系数和用于签名加密的密钥均基于隐藏的处理器密钥。签名验证是在后台执行的,与程序执行同时进行,从而减少了对性能的负面影响。初步结果表明,建议的处理器扩展将以相对较小的系统复杂度和执行时间增加来防止执行任何未经授权的代码。

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