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Preventing Cache-Based Side-Channel Attacks in a Cloud Environment

机译:在云环境中防止基于缓存的侧通道攻击

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摘要

Cloud computing is a unique technique for outsourcing and aggregating computational hardware needs. By abstracting the underlying machines cloud computing is able to share resources among multiple mutually distrusting clients. While there are numerous practical benefits to this system, this kind of resource sharing enables new forms of information leakage such as hardware side-channels. In this paper, we investigate the usage of CPU-cache based side-channels in the cloud and how they compare to traditional side-channel attacks. We go on to demonstrate that new techniques are necessary to mitigate these sorts of attacks in a cloud environment, and specify the requirements for such solutions. Finally, we design and implement two new cache-based side-channel mitigation techniques, implementing them in a state-of-the-art cloud system, and testing them against traditional cloud technology.
机译:云计算是一种用于外包和汇总计算硬件需求的独特技术。通过抽象底层计算机,云计算能够在多个互不信任的客户端之间共享资源。尽管此系统有许多实际好处,但这种资源共享可实现新形式的信息泄漏,例如硬件辅助信道。在本文中,我们研究了云中基于CPU缓存的辅助通道的使用以及它们与传统的辅助通道攻击的比较。我们继续证明,必须有新技术来缓解云环境中的此类攻击,并指定此类解决方案的要求。最后,我们设计并实现了两种新的基于缓存的边信道缓解技术,将它们在最新的云系统中实施,并针对传统云技术进行了测试。

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