I offer examples showing that, pace G. E. Moore, it is possible to assert âQ and I don't believe that Qâ sincerely, truly, and without any absurdity. The examples also refute the following principles: (a) justification to assert p entails justification to assert that one believes p (Gareth Evans); (b) the sincerity condition on assertion is that one believes what one says (John Searle); and (c) to assert (to someone) something that one believes to be false is to lie (Don Fallis).View full textDownload full text Keywords assertion, language, sincerity, lying, beliefRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2011.611150
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机译：我提供的示例表明，按照G. E. Moore的步伐，可以断言“ Q，但我不相信Q”是真诚，真实且没有任何荒谬性的。这些示例还驳斥了以下原则：（a）主张p的辩护意味着主张一个人相信p（Gareth Evans）的辩护； （b）断言的诚意条件是相信某人所说的话（约翰·塞尔）； （c）断言（对某人）某人认为是虚假的谎言（唐·法利斯）。查看全文下载全文关键词在线”，services_compact：“ citeulike，netvibes，twitter，technorati，可口，linkedin，facebook，stumbleupon，digg，google，更多”，发布号：“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2011.611150
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