Reply to Contessa, Ghins, and Healey

摘要

Gabriele Contessa (2010), Michel Ghins (2010) and Richard Healey (2010)neach broach issues concerning realism, and their constructive critique pre-nsents a strong challenge, requiring me to specify precisely where I take it thatnScientific Representation (henceforth SR) lands us. Contessa argues that therenI have left not only metaphysical realism but also common sense realismnbehind. I’ll argue that it isn’t so, though I reject the metaphysical realismnthat might be taken to underpin our common sense. But then Ghins andnHealey challenge just what it is that is represented, if at all, by scientificnmodels and theories, and I will maintain that in a truly robust sensenmodels do represent the observable phenomena.