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The implied cost of equity capital, corporate investment and chief executive officer turnover

机译:股本资本,公司投资和首席执行官营业额的隐含成本

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摘要

This study investigates how the cost of equity capital, along with corporate investment, affects chief executive officer (CEO) turnover decisions. We hypothesize that the cost of equity conveys information about firm performance uncertainty that is informative of CEO talent. Consistently, our empirical results show that the likelihood of CEO turnover is positively associated with the implied cost of equity, after controlling for earnings and stock performance measures and risk factors. Additional analysis of reverse causality supports the causal effect of the high cost of equity on CEO dismissals. We also find that the positive association is more pronounced for firms that are more likely to suffer from underinvestment problems. These results suggest that the cost of equity plays a more important role in assessing CEO performance when the firm needs more external equity capital to pursue investment opportunities.
机译:这项研究调查了股本成本以及公司投资如何影响首席执行官(CEO)的营业额决策。我们假设权益成本传达了有关公司绩效不确定性的信息,这些信息可以为首席执行官提供信息。一致地,我们的实证结果表明,在控制了收益和股票绩效指标以及风险因素之后,CEO离职的可能性与隐含的股权成本成正相关。反向因果关系的其他分析支持了高昂的股权成本对CEO解雇的因果关系。我们还发现,对于那些更容易遭受投资不足问题的公司而言,积极的联系更为明显。这些结果表明,当公司需要更多的外部股权资本来寻求投资机会时,股票成本在评估CEO绩效中起着更为重要的作用。

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