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Change gears before speeding up: The roles of Chief Executive Officer human capital and venture capitalist monitoring in Chief Executive Officer change before initial public offering

机译:加速前更换齿轮:首席执行官人力资本和风险资本家在首次公开发行之前将在首席执行官改变中的人力资本和风险资本家监测的角色

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Research Summary With data on 1,156 venture capitalist (VC)-backed U.S. initial public offerings (IPOs), we find that the initial level of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) human capital (HC) when a firm receives its first VC investment is negatively related to the likelihood of changing CEO before IPO. The distance between a firm and its lead VC has a positive effect on the likelihood and this effect is stronger when the initial CEO HC is lower. These results suggest that as a larger distance amounts to greater cost of VC direct monitoring, VC is more compelled to change CEO, especially when initial CEO HC is lower. Controlling for the endogeneity of CEO change, we find that CEO change before IPO has a positive relationship with the firm's IPO valuation and changes in operating performance. Managerial Summary Changing CEO prior to IPO is common in startups, especially in those backed by VCs. We argue that VC can monitor a portfolio firm in two ways (which are not mutually exclusive):directly monitoringonsite the firm andindirectly monitoringrelying upon the firm's top management especially CEO. We propose and find empirical evidence to support that as a larger distance between a firm and its lead VC amounts to greater cost of direct monitoring and thus making direct monitoring less feasible, the VC is more compelled to change CEO, especially when the CEO is deemed less capable (i.e., having a lower level of human capital). We also find that CEO change before IPO increases a firm's IPO valuation and changes in operating performance.
机译:研究综述随着1156风险投资(VC)数据-backed美国首次公开发行股票(IPO),我们发现,首席执行官(CEO)人力资本(HC)的初始水平时,公司收到第一个VC投资呈负相关关系到IPO之前,改变CEO的可能性。一个公司及其引线VC之间的距离对的可能性的积极作用,并且这种作用更强当初始CEO HC较低。这些结果表明,作为一个更大的距离达的VC直接监测更大的成本,VC更被迫改变CEO,尤其是当初始CEO HC较低。在控制了CEO变革的内生性,我们发现,CEO变更IPO与该公司的IPO估值存在正相关关系,并改变经营业绩之前。之前的IPO管理概要CEO更换是在初创常见,尤其是在那些由风险投资支持。我们认为,VC可以通过两种方式(这不是相互排斥的)监控投资组合公司:直接monitoringonsite公司andindirectly monitoringrelying在该公司的高层管理人员尤其是CEO。我们建议,并找到支持的经验证据,作为一个公司和它的主角VC相当于直接监控更大的成本,从而使直接监测不太可行之间有较大的距离,VC更被迫改变CEO,特别是当CEO被认为是能力较差(即,具有人力资本的较低水平)。我们还发现,CEO变更IPO增加了公司的IPO估值和改变经营业绩之前。

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