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A bi-objective game-theoretic model for collaboration formation between software development firms

机译:软件开发公司之间合作的双目标博弈模型

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摘要

Requirement for formation of collaborations has been on increase for the software development industry, especially for smaller to medium sized firms, due to rapid technological advancements, requirements for diversified skills, ever enhancing demands for innovation and fierce competition. Collaborative product development in an alliance enables the firms to benefit from each other’s diversified skills and the experience as a result of which they can develop products more rapidly and of better quality as well resulting in a higher payoff. Also, the development costs decrease. However, to avoid undesired results, selection of an appropriate partner firm for collaboration is of utmost importance keeping in view the objectives of alliance formation of both the strategic partners. One-way partner selection techniques available in the literature are impractical as they enable a firm to rank potential partners only from its own perspective while ignoring their objectives. This problem is addressed by the two-way partner selection techniques, however, they either ignore the payoff distribution criteria or the proposed criteria is unfair. More importantly, existing techniques consider that firm collaborate only with the objective to enhance their financial payoff which might not always be the case. The fact that collaborating firms may have one but different objectives for collaboration, or, each may have multiple objectives is largely neglected. To address the scenarios in which firms may collaborate due to multiple and possibly different objectives, this work proposes a bi-objective game-theoretic model that enables a firm to select an appropriate partner based on the individual preferences of both on the following two objectives: 1) learning and 2) financial revenue. Moreover, this model calculates the pay-off that each firm should get whether only monetary, only in the form of learning or both. The calculation of payoff share is based on the following parameters: 1) individual goals of collaboration of partner selecting firms on the said two objectives, 2) their level of cost contribution, 3) cooperation ratio and 4) knowledge investment difference. Comprehensive analysis of various scenarios is done for the proposed Nash Bargaining payoff distribution model to find the optimum strategy of collaborating firms for each scenario.
机译:由于技术的飞速发展,对多种技能的需求,对创新的需求和激烈的竞争,对于软件开发行业,尤其​​是对中小型公司而言,形成协作的需求不断增加。联盟中的协作产品开发使两家公司可以从彼此的技能和经验中受益,从而可以更快地开发产品并提高质量,从而获得更高的回报。而且,开发成本降低了。但是,为了避免产生不希望的结果,选择合适的合作伙伴进行协作至关重要,同时要考虑到两个战略合作伙伴组成联盟的目标。文献中提供的单向伙伴选择技术是不切实际的,因为它们使公司只能从自己的角度对潜在伙伴进行排名,而忽略其目标。双向合作伙伴选择技术解决了这个问题,但是,他们要么忽略了收益分配标准,要么提议的标准不公平。更重要的是,现有技术认为公司仅与提高财务收益的目标合作,而情况并非总是如此。协作公司可能有一个但不同的协作目标,或者每个公司可能有多个目标,这一事实在很大程度上被忽略了。为了解决企业可能因多个目标而可能相互合作的场景,这项工作提出了一个双目标博弈论模型,该模型使企业能够基于以下两个目标的个人偏好来选择合适的合作伙伴: 1)学习和2)财政收入。此外,该模型计算每个公司应获得的收益,无论是仅货币形式,仅学习形式还是两者兼有。收益份额的计算基于以下参数:1)合作伙伴选择公司在上述两个目标上的个人合作目标,2)他们的成本贡献水平,3)合作比率和4)知识投资差异。对提议的纳什讨价还价收益分配模型进行了各种情景的综合分析,以找到针对每种情景的合作公司的最佳策略。

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