The Relative Nature of Perception: A Response to Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp (2015)

摘要

Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp present an argument about the incommensurate relationship between affordance perception and spatial perception in a criticism of Proffitt and Linkenauger’s phenotypic approach to perception. Many of their criticisms are based on a difference in the interpretation of the core ideas underlying the phenotypic approach. The most important of these differences in interpretations concern fundamental assumptions about the nature of the perceptions of size and distance themselves. Extent perception must be relative to the organism; therefore, there can be no veridical perception of space. Also, we argue in the phenotypic approach that space perception is an emergent property of affordance perception; they are not different types of perceptions as Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp presume. Third, affordance perception need not be perfectly accurate, just good enough. Additionally, affordance perception need not be dichotomous; this presumption likely originates in the methodology typically employed to study affordance perception. Finally, I agree with Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp that joint research efforts will clarify and improve our understanding of these issues.