首页> 美国卫生研究院文献>Health Services Research >Consequences of Health Insurance Cost Sharing Among Low‐Income Medicare Beneficiaries: Evidence from Benefit Cliffs in Medicaid and Medicare’s Prescription Drug Subsidy Program
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Consequences of Health Insurance Cost Sharing Among Low‐Income Medicare Beneficiaries: Evidence from Benefit Cliffs in Medicaid and Medicare’s Prescription Drug Subsidy Program

机译:低收入Medicare受益人的健康保险费用的后果:来自Medicaids和Medicare处方药物补贴计划的利益悬崖的证据

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摘要

Cost sharing is intended to mitigate the effects of moral hazard in health insurance but can have unintended consequences if patients underuse medically beneficial care that is subject to out‐of‐pocket costs. The Medicare program requires substantial cost sharing, including deductibles and coinsurance for outpatient care and prescription drugs. However, little is known about the consequences of this benefit design for low‐income Medicare beneficiaries who do not qualify for Medicaid or Part D Low‐Income Subsidies (LIS), which defray these costs. In this study, we harnessed quasi‐random variation in exposure to Medicare cost sharing, resulting from “cliffs” in cost sharing subsidies above vs. below income eligibility thresholds for Medicaid and the LIS, to assess the effects of cost sharing on low‐income beneficiaries’ out‐of‐pocket spending and use of care.
机译:成本分摊旨在减轻道德危害在健康保险中的影响,但如果患者欠较高的费用,如果患者欠下医疗保健,可能会产生意外的后果。 Medicare计划需要大量成本分享,包括用于门诊护理和处方药的扣除和共同保险。但是,关于这种福利设计的后果对不符合医疗补助或D部分低收入补贴(LIS)的低收入Medicare受益人而言,这几乎都很熟悉这一效益设计的后果。在这项研究中,我们利用了对Medicare成本共享的拟随机变异,由上述成本分摊费用的“悬崖”导致与医疗补助和LIS低于收入资格阈值,以评估成本分享对低收入的影响受益人的袖珍支出和使用护理。

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