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Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations with Strong Selection and Weak Mutation

机译:具有强选择和弱突变的有限种群的演化博弈动力学

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摘要

We study stochastic game dynamics in finite populations. To this end we extend the classical Moran process to incorporate frequency-dependent selection and mutation. For 2 × 2 games, we give a complete analysis of the long-run behavior when mutation rates are small. For 3 × 3 coordination games, we provide a simple rule to determine which strategy will be selected in large populations. The expected motion in our model resembles the standard replicator dynamics when the population is large, but is qualitatively different when the population is small. Our analysis shows that even in large finite populations the behavior of a replicator-like system can be different from that of the standard replicator dynamics. As an application, we consider selective language dynamics. We determine which language will be spoken in finite large populations. The results have an intuitive interpretation but would not be expected from an analysis of the replicator dynamics.
机译:我们研究有限种群中的随机博弈动力学。为此,我们扩展了经典的Moran过程,以结合频率依赖性选择和突变。对于2×2游戏,我们对突变率较小时的长期行为进行了完整分析。对于3×3的协调游戏,我们提供了一条简单的规则来确定将在大型人群中选择哪种策略。当人口众多时,我们模型中的预期运动类似于标准复制器动力学,但是当人口较小时,其定性不同。我们的分析表明,即使在较大的有限总体中,类似复制器的系统的行为也可能与标准复制器动力学的行为不同。作为一种应用程序,我们考虑选择性的语言动态。我们确定将在有限的大量人群中使用哪种语言。结果具有直观的解释,但无法通过复制器动力学分析获得预期结果。

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