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Knowing when to trust others: An ERP study of decision making after receiving information from unknown people

机译:知道何时信任他人:从陌生人那里收到信息后进行的ERP决策研究

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摘要

To address the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie choices made after receiving information from an anonymous individual, reaction times (Experiment 1) and event-related brain potentials (Experiment 2) were recorded as participants played three variants of the coin toss game. In this game, participants guess the outcomes of unseen coin tosses after a person in another room (dubbed 'the reporter’) observes the coin toss outcomes and then sends reports (which may or may not be truthful) to participants about whether the coins landed on heads or tails. Participants knew that the reporter's interests were aligned with their own (common interests), opposed to their own (conflicting interests) or opposed to their own, but that the reporter was penalized every time he or she sent a false report about the coin toss outcome (penalty for lying). In the common interests and penalty for lying conditions, participants followed the reporter's reports over 90% of the time, in contrast to <59% of the time in the conflicting interests condition. Reaction time results indicated that participants took similar amounts of time to respond in the common interests and penalty for lying conditions and that they were reliably faster than in the conflicting interests condition. Event-related potentials timelocked to the reporter's reports revealed a larger P2, P3 and late positive complex response in the common interests condition than in the other two, suggesting that participants’ brains processed the reporter's reports differently in the common interests condition relative to the other two conditions. Results suggest that even when people behave as if they trust information, they consider communicative efforts of individuals whose interests are aligned with their own to be slightly more informative than those of individuals who are made trustworthy by an institution, such as a penalty for lying.
机译:为了解决作为从匿名个人接收信息后做出选择的基础的神经认知机制,当参与者玩掷硬币游戏的三种变体时,记录了反应时间(实验1)和与事件相关的脑电势(实验2)。在该游戏中,参与者猜测另一个房间里的人(被称为“记者”)观察到抛硬币的结果后,看不见的抛硬币的结果,然后向参与者发送有关硬币是否已落地的报告(可能不真实)在头或尾上。参与者知道,报告者的利益与他们自己的(共同利益)保持一致,反对他们自己的(利益冲突)或反对自己的利益,但是,每当他或她发送关于抛硬币结果的虚假报告时,报告者都会受到惩罚。 (对说谎的惩罚)。在共同利益和撒谎条件下,参与者在超过90%的时间遵循报告者的报告,而在利益冲突的情况下,则少于59%。反应时间结果表明,参与者在共同利益和说谎条件下的惩罚花费了相似的时间,并且比冲突利益条件下的响应时间要可靠。与报告者时间相关的与事件相关的电位显示,在共同利益条件下,P2,P3和后期积极的复杂反应比在其他两个条件下要大,这表明参与者的大脑在共同利益条件下对报告者的报告相对于其他人而言是不同的。两个条件。结果表明,即使人们的行为好像他们信任信息一样,他们也认为,与自己的利益保持一致的个人的沟通努力,比那些受到机构信任的个人(例如,说谎的惩罚)所提供的信息更加有益。

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