通过对国家级贫困县A县竞争性扶贫项目运作逻辑的探析发现，依附于科层制之下的扶贫项目在实施前的选择性平衡、实施中的反科层制逻辑以及落地后的短期效应，共同造成项目制在扶贫开发中功能的式微。扶贫项目在地方实践中的非均衡分配规制了贫困地区脱贫的步伐，项目进村时呈现出的“委托—代理”关系使地方在扶贫项目打包中以“反控制”的策略从中谋利，项目制“短、平、快”的目标导向弱化了扶贫开发的可持续性。面对扶贫项目存在的一系列问题，需要进一步加强项目执行的监管力度，提高基层政府的精准扶贫治理能力，制定扶贫开发的后续扶持政策。%Based on the analysis of the operational logic of the competitive poverty alleviation project in A county, this paper revealed the fact that the poverty alleviation projects attached to the bureaucracy had a selective balance before implementation, and its poverty alleviation function was sharply weakened by the logic of an anti⁃bureaucracy system and short⁃term effects. The practice of unbalanced distribution in poverty alleviation project made the poor areas hard to shake off poverty. The “principal⁃agent” model in project implementation urged local governments to make profits in a “anti⁃control” strategy way from the project. The“short, flat, fast” orientation weakened the sustainability of poverty alleviation . To solve these problems, the nation needs to strengthen the supervision of project implementation, improve local governments� ability of accurate poverty alleviation management, and work out sustainable follow⁃up policies.
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