城乡建设用地增减挂钩政策异化背后的地方政府行为机理

摘要

The local government is the implementer of LUTRG project ,and its behavior is directly related to the effect of the policy implementation .In reality ,the local government has strong alienation motive of LUTRG project;the motive was more likely to become a reality because of larger discretion of local government ,imperfection of performance appraisal system and non‐restraining behavior of local government .In order to eliminate the alienation of LUTRG project ,we need to accelerate the institutional innovation so as to weaken the alienation motive and offer no possibility for alienation .%地方政府是城乡建设用地增减挂钩政策的具体实施者，其行为直接关系到政策实施的效果。现实中，为了追求财政收入与政绩最大化，地方政府具有强烈的异化城乡建设用地增减挂钩政策的动机；同时地方政府自由裁量权较大、绩效考核体系不完善及农民无法有效约束地方政府行为使得地方政府很容易使这种动机变成现实。因此，要遏止城乡建设用地增减挂钩政策异化现象，必须加快制度创新，削弱地方政府异化城乡建设用地增减挂钩政策的动机，并消除异化的可能。