基于博弈论视角的公司治理中独立董事有效性研究

摘要

独立董事制度是公司治理结构中的重要一环,但自引入我国以来,并没有达到预期的效果。一个重要原因是独立董事在与上市公司高层管理者之间的博弈中处于劣势地位。利用博弈论的基本原理,构建两者之间博弈的模型,通过模型分析,得出独立董事在公司治理中有效性难于发挥的问题所在,并针对问题提出解决建议就显得很有必要。而研究认为独立董事在公司治理中有效性难于发挥的问题在于独立董事履行相关职能的成本太高、对其相关行为的声誉激励不强和对独立董事及高层管理者行为的查处力度不够大等,故应针对这三个方面采取一些实质性的措施。%independent director system is a very crucial part in corporate governance structure,but since it was introduced into our country,it has not taken the expected effect.One important reason is that independent director is at a disadvantaged position in the game between independent director and senior manager in public company.So it is very necessary to build the game model between them through the basic game theory,and then to find the main factors why independent director hard to play effectiveness in corporate governance,and last to point out the advices to the questions.This research believes that the main points why independent director hard to play effectiveness in corporate governance are the cost of independent director exerciser related functions is so high,the honor motivation of their related behaviors is a little weak and the effort of investigation and prosecution to the behaviors of independent director and senior manager is a little vulnerable,so it is must to take concert measures to the questions.