不同控制环境下高管薪酬对企业绩效的影响

摘要

Using the data from 2008 to 2012 in A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, this paper analyzes the effects of executive compensation on firm performance separately in state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies under different controlled environment.The empirical result shows that compared with the state-owned listed companies,executive compensation influences the non-state-owned companies ’ firm performance more intensively,which appears more positive significance under the “bad controlled”and “no-part-time”environment,while it is hardly found in the state-owned companies.The conclusion indicates that the “performance pay”contract can not work effectively in the state-owned companies,and the controlled environment is an important influencing factor of executive compensation on firm performance in the non-state-owned companies.%运用2008—2012年沪、深两市 A 股上市公司的相关数据，分组检验了在不同的控制环境情况下①国有上市公司和非国有上市公司高管薪酬对企业绩效的影响。研究结果表明：相对于国有上市公司而言，高管薪酬对非国有上市公司绩效的影响更显著，且在控制水平差和“非兼职”②的企业内部显著水平更强，而在国有企业中这种关系并不明显。研究结论说明控制环境是影响非国有企业薪酬激励机制发挥作用的一个重要因素，而在国有企业中“绩效薪酬”契约并不能有效发挥作用。