大股东资金占用与企业绩效--内部控制的“消化”作用

摘要

本文从委托代理理论出发，以715家上海证券交易所 A 股上市公司为研究样本，构造了中介模型，探讨大股东资金占用对内部控制和企业绩效的影响以及内部控制在其中的中介作用。研究发现，内部控制在大股东资金占用与企业绩效的关系中起完全中介的作用，同时也验证了大股东资金占用对企业绩效的负向影响，支持了“掏空论”。本文还分析了模型解释能力的变化，指出了在后续研究中寻找中介变量的必要性。该研究结论为大股东资金占用的监管趋向和追责模式提供了理论依据，对上市公司加强内部控制也有一定的指导意义。%Based on a sample of 715 A share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange,this paper draws on a principal-agent theory and establishes a mediating model to investigate the influence of large shareholder expropriation on firm performance and the mediating effect of internal control.The results show that the impact of large shareholder expropriation on firm performance is fully mediated by internal control.It is also suggested that large shareholder expropriation positively associated with firm performance,which supports the “tunneling theory”.In addition,this paper analyzes the variation of R2 ,pointing out the necessity of looking mediating variable in subsequent research.The conclusion provides a theoretical basis for large shareholder expropriation regulatory trends and responsibility pattern,providing some guidance on companies'internal control.