第三方负责回收的Dowrside-Risk闭环供应链协调性研究

摘要

In the context of a risk-neutral supplier and a third-party logistics supplier and a downside-risk retailer, a downside-risk closed loop supply chain model is established by using game theory, and the impact of reve-nue-and-expense sharing contract is analyzed in the channel, which shows that the contract may not coordinate such a channel on the theory of downside-risk control. Also, a risk-sharing contract which is composed of reve-nue-and-expense contract and return policy is designed that offers the desired downside protection to the retailer, provides more profits to the agents, and accomplishes channel coordination. Moreover, an application example is given for testing the effectiveness and feasibility of the risk-sharing contract.In the context of a risk-neutral supplier and a third-party logistics supplier and a downside-risk retailer, a downside-risk closed loop supply chain model is established by using game theory, and the impact of reve-nue-and-expense sharing contract is analyzed in the channel, which shows that the contract may not coordinate such a channel on the theory of downside-risk control. Also, a risk-sharing contract which is composed of reve-nue-and-expense contract and return policy is designed that offers the desired downside protection to the retailer, provides more profits to the agents, and accomplishes channel coordination. Moreover, an application example is given for testing the effectiveness and feasibility of the risk-sharing contract.%以风险中性制造商、第三方物流服务商和具有下行风险特性的销售商组成的闭环供应链系统为背景,证明了在Downside-Risk约束下收益费用共享契约不能使闭环供应链协调.通过将补偿策略附加到该契约,设计了风险共享契约,既能满足下行风险约束,又保证供应链参与方利润均有增量,实现了Downside-Risk约束下闭环供应链的协调.最后通过应用算例说明了风险共享契约的有效性和可行性.