制造商信息私有条件下的双渠道供应链定价决策

摘要

针对由风险规避型制造商拥有的直销渠道和风险规避型零售商拥有的传统零售渠道组成的双渠道供应链模型，首先研究制造商和零售商的风险规避信息为共同知识条件下，直销渠道和传统零售渠道的定价决策。进一步分析制造商风险规避度为私有信息条件下，制造商和零售商的最优定价策略，探讨精炼贝叶斯均衡定价的存在条件。研究表明，信息非对称条件下，零售商即使存在信念的修正，其零售渠道的定价与制造商的定价决策类型始终保持一致，而制造商的最终定价策略选择有多种。在不同参数条件下，该非对称信息动态博弈模型可能存在分离均衡、混同均衡和准分离均衡。%For a dual channel supply chain consisting of a risk averse manufacturer ’ s direct channel and a risk averse retailer’s channel, this paper studies the prices of direct channel and traditional retail channel when the risk averse value of manufacturer and retailer are common information .Then it analyzes the channel prices when the risk averse value of manufacturer is his own private information .And the required conditions of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium are studied .It is shown that the retailer ’ s optimal retail price type is consistent with manufacturer ’ s optimal direct price type , and even the retailer has belief revision .But the manufacturer has sev-eral choices of pricing decision .Under different parameter conditions , there are separating equilibrium , pooling equilibrium and semi -separating equilibrium in the dynamic game under asymmetric information .