基于有信息委托人视角的创意转化契约设计研究

摘要

In order to formalize the signaling revelation problem facing an informed principal and an agent when they sign a contract in the process of creative idea transaction, this paper demonstrates the separate equilibrium existing in contract of creative idea transaction by establishing a Stackelberg signal game model, which is based on the features of creative idea, and an analysis on the effects that the intellectual property protection environ-ment and the industrial maturity respectively have on the equilibrium contract is also made in this research.It is also found that the separating equilibrium contract makes the agent ’ s efforts distorted downward when adverse selection of the principal and moral hazard of the agent coexist.%为了形式化一个有信息的委托人在创意的转化过程中，与代理人缔约时所面临的信号显示问题，以创意的特性为基础，通过建立Stackelberg信号博弈模型，证明了创意转化契约分离均衡的存在性，并分析了知识产权保护强度和产业成熟度对均衡契约的影响。研究还发现，当同时存在委托人的逆向选择和代理人的道德风险时，分离均衡契约使得代理人的努力水平会产生向下的扭曲。