Linear Incentive Contract for Principal-agent Problem with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

机译：具有信息不对称和道德风险的委托人问题的线性激励契约

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The principal-agent theory is applied to solve the problem with asymmetrical information in economics, management and society. Mathematically, the principal-agent problem is a bi-level programming problem which is very difficult to solve. In this paper, w

机译：委托代理理论被用来解决经济学，管理学和社会中信息不对称的问题。在数学上，委托代理问题是一个很难解决的双层编程问题。在本文中，w

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《Circuits and Systems, (APCCAS), 2006 IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on》|2006年|P.634-637|共4页
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Li Shanliang; Wang Chunhua;
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中图分类工业技术;
关键词
contracts; incentive schemes; pricing; asymmetric information; bi-level programming problem; economics; linear incentive contract; linear pooling contract; linear screening contract; management; moral hazard; principal-agent problem; society; Principal-agent theory; a;

机译：合同;激励计划;定价;不对称信息;双层规划问题;经济学;线性激励合同;线性合并合同;线性筛选合同;管理;道德风险;主代理问题;社会;委托代理理论; a;
入库时间 2022-08-26 15:15:35

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2. The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case [J] . Silvers R. Games and economic behavior . 2012,第1期

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4. Linear Incentive Contract for Principal-agent Problem with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard [C] . Li Shanliang, Wang Chunhua IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on Circuits and Systems . 2006

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5. INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH AUDITING AND MONITORING IN THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP [D] . WOODLAND, BILL M. 1981

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7. The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard : the ex post contracting case [O] . Silvers Randy 2012

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Linear Incentive Contract for Principal-agent Problem with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

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