政府监管与矿山治污博弈模型

摘要

The game model for the relationship between government regulation and mine pollution management is a common application of game theory in the field of mining.This paper has conducted the researches to this model,and the mine pollution has been divided into two different types,i.e.cumulative one and non cumulative one.It concludes that when the mine pollution belongs to the first case,a small amount of government regulation can let the mine deal with pollution absolutely.In addition,when it belongs to the second case,the supervision by public opinion should be kept and the government should response to the populace to supervise more than a certain number,which can make the mine deal with pollution absolutely,in order to realize the maximization of the welfare of the society as a whole.%政府监管与矿山治污之间的博弈关系是博弈论在采矿行业的常见应用，本文对此模型进行了研究，把矿山的污染分为累积性污染和非累积性污染2类。得出的结论是：当矿山的污染具有累积性时，政府少量的监管可以让其绝对治污；如果矿山的污染没有累积性，在保持舆论监督的同时，政府对群众举报的响应率超过一定数值，才能让矿山绝对治污，从而实现社会总体福利的最大化。