Under the strategy of "One Belt and One Road",the business cooperation is a complicated systematic project and the strategic choice of enterprises shows a clustering feature across the strategic ecosphere,where the stability of the cooperation between enterprises become an important factor that affects the whole strategic goal.An important feature that many projects have under the One Belt and One Road strategy is that both the cooperation with local civil / commercial subjects and the more involvement of local government are required.Existing researches focus on the overview and summary based on exploratory experience,lacking in-depth theoretical analysis that reveals enterprises' strategic choice in the process of cluster evolution of cooperation.Using evolutionary game theory,this paper analyzes the enterprise cooperation and opportunistic behavior in the process of government regulation.The research results show that under the condition of rational economic man hypothesis,enterprises and local governments will adopt opportunism behavior in the process of enterprise cooperation.The governments should set special regulatory bodies,which should adopt the strategy of dynamic support or penalties to promote the stable development of the regional economy.%“一带一路”战略下企业合作是一项复杂的系统性工程,整个战略生态圈中企业的战略选择呈现群集特征,其中企业间合作的稳定性成为影响整个战略目标的重要因素.“一带一路”战略下很多项目的一个重要特点是,既需要与当地民商事主体进行合作,又更多的依赖当地政府的介入.相关研究对于三方博弈主体研究较少,并且少量已有对三方博弈主体博弈的研究仍然在给定一方博弈策略的基础上对其他博弈双方进行分析,缺少深入地分析揭示企业合作过程中战略选择的群集本体演化规律,也少有对东道国地方政府介入该合作动态过程的关注.本文用演化博弈论分析企业合作以及地方政府监管过程中的机会主义行为,研究结果表明,在理性经济人假设条件下,企业和东道国地方政府在企业合作过程中都会发生机会主义行为,上级国际政府应该专门设置监管机构,同时监管机构需要采取动态扶持或者惩罚的策略,才能够促进“一带一路”覆盖地区经济的稳定发展.
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