首页> 中文期刊>武汉理工大学学报(交通科学与工程版) >基于重复博弈的P2P网络节点行为策略模型

基于重复博弈的P2P网络节点行为策略模型

     

摘要

目前提出的P2P网络节点的博弈模型大多没有考虑节点的类型,没有考虑重复博弈所产生的和一次博弈不同的结果.针对这些问题,根据节点的推荐信任值来对节点进行分类,并分析节点类型的行为特征和重复博弈的特征,提出了一种基于重复博弈的P2P网络节点行为策略模型.在此基础上,利用重复博弈的贴现率来分析博弈双方采取何种策略才能获得最大收益以及节点行为策略调整的约束性条件.使用博弈论仿真工具Gambit验证了该模型的有效性.%The existing game model of P2P nodes always do not consider types of nodes, and also the different between repeated game and one-time game. To solve these problems, this paper classify nodes with the recommendation trust of nodes, after deeply study on the behavioral characteristics of nodes and the character of repeated game theory, this paper presents a game model of behavior strategies for nodes in P2P networks based on the repeated game theory. In this model, it discuss about how the peer can achieve the most profit by using discount rate of repeated game theory, even the constraint condition of behavior strategies for nodes. Furthermore, this model is proved to be availability with game theory simulation tools named Gambit.

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