风险基金管理中的最优激励合同研究

摘要

The principal-agent relationship in management of ventureinvestment funds is discussed in the article. By applying the principal-agent theory, it studies the optimal incentive contract when there is one observable variable that is profit on venture capital and further more the optimal incentive contract when there is another observable variable that can offer more information. It puts forward suggestion about how to develop venture investment in our country.%运用委托-代理理论对风险投资基金管理中的委托-代理关系进行了讨论;对基金管理人的工作成果为单一可观测变量时基金管理人的最优激励合同进行了研究,并对该情况下的代理成本进行了分析;最后讨论了除基金管理人的工作成果外存在其他可观测变量(如另一个风险投资基金的收益)时基金管理人的最优激励合同,指出当其他可观测变量能提供更多与基金管理人努力水平相关的信息时,把该变量写入合同将降低代理成本.